Wyoming Law Review
Volume 16

Number 1

Article 1

January 2016

The Effect of the Successful Assertion of the State Secrets
Privilege in a Civil Lawsuit in Which the Government is Not a
Party: When, If Ever, Should the Defendant Shoulder the Burden of
the Government’s Successful Privilege Claim?
Edward J. Imwinkelried

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr

Recommended Citation
Imwinkelried, Edward J. (2016) "The Effect of the Successful Assertion of the State Secrets Privilege in a
Civil Lawsuit in Which the Government is Not a Party: When, If Ever, Should the Defendant Shoulder the
Burden of the Government’s Successful Privilege Claim?," Wyoming Law Review: Vol. 16 : No. 1 , Article 1.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol16/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Imwinkelried: The Effect of the Successful Assertion of the State Secrets Privi

WYOMING LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 16

2016

NUMBER 1

THE EFFECT OF THE SUCCESSFUL
ASSERTION OF THE STATE SECRETS
PRIVILEGE IN A CIVIL LAWSUIT IN WHICH
THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT A PARTY:
WHEN, IF EVER, SHOULD THE DEFENDANT
SHOULDER THE BURDEN
OF THE GOVERNMENT’S SUCCESSFUL
PRIVILEGE CLAIM?
Edward J. Imwinkelried *
“If the privilege is successfully claimed by the government in litigation to which
it is not a party, the effect is simply to make the evidence unavailable, as though
a witness had died or claimed the privilege against self-incrimination . . . .”1
—FED. R. EVID. 509 Advisory Committee note to 1969 draft.
“The result [of the government’s successful assertion of the state
secrets privilege] is simply that the evidence is unavailable, as though a
witness had died, and the case will proceed accordingly, with
no consequence save those resulting from the loss of the evidence.”2
—Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
* Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Davis; former
chair, Evidence Section, American Association of Law Schools; author, The New Wigmore:
Evidentiary Privileges (2d ed. 2010).
1
FED. R. EVID. 509(e) Advisory Committee note to 1969 draft. See Order, 56 F.R.D. 183,
254 (1972). See also PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN & SUSAN W. CRUMP, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES:
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES RELATING TO WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS IN FEDERAL LAW CASES § 5:20,
at 580 (2d ed. 2003–2015) [hereinafter FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES] (publishing annual
revisions).
2

Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Russo v.
Mitchell, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984), aff ’d, 807 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and cert. denied 484 U.S.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the basic functions of any country’s government is to protect
its citizens and territory against invasion.3 In performing that function, the
government sometimes has a legitimate interest in protecting secret information,
such as plans for military operations. Consequently, most national legal systems
recognize the government has a topical privilege4 to prevent disclosure of such
information in public legal proceedings.5 In his 1807 opinion in United States
v. Burr 6—the treason prosecution of Vice President Aaron Burr—Chief Justice
Marshall “hinted” at the existence of the privilege.7 In that prosecution, Burr
served President Jefferson with a subpoena duces tecum, demanding he produce
the President’s correspondence with General Wilkerson. In his opinion upholding
the subpoena, Chief Justice Marshall stated nothing before the Court indicated
that the correspondence “contain[ed] any matter the disclosure of which would
endanger the public safety.”8 The United States Supreme Court formally
recognized the privilege in its landmark 1953 decision, United States v. Reynolds.9
As evidenced by the 146-year gap between Burr and Reynolds, throughout
most of this Republic’s history the federal government has rarely invoked the
870 (1987) (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
(HORNBOOK SERIES) 233 (Edward W. Cleary ed. 1972)).
3

See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651).

4

While privileges, such as attorney-client and spousal protect communications between the
parties, topical privileges protect certain types of facts rather than communications per se. See 2
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 8.1 (Richard D. Friedman
ed., 2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES].
5
In the leading American decision, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953), the
United States Supreme Court relied heavily on English experience with the Crown privilege. See
also EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES, supra note 4, § 12.1, at 1654 n.3 (explaining even Bentham, the most
vociferous opponent of privileges, supported the privilege); EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES, supra note 4,
§ 12.2.1, at 1674 (English law); EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES, supra note 4, § 12.2.2, at 1686 (Irish
law); EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES, supra note 4, § 12.2.3, at 1692 (Australian law); Jared T. Nelson
& Geoffrey A. Vance, What Happens in China Stays in China, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 26, 2015, at 9
(distinguished between “labeled” and “unlabeled” state secrets in Chinese law).
6

United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807). See Sean M. Ward, Note, The State
Secrets Protection Act (SSPA): Statutory Reform of the State Secrets Privilege, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
681, 683 (2009) [hereinafter SSPA] (“The letter, written by General James Wilkinson, contained a
description of Burr’s alleged conspiracy to create a new country composed of the Western states and
to incite an illegal war with Spanish territories.”).
7

J. Steven Gardner, Comment, The State Secret Privilege Invoked in Civil Litigation: A
Proposal for Statutory Relief, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567, 568 (1994) [hereinafter The State Secret
Privilege Invoked in Civil Litigation]. See also Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37 (where the Chief Justice referred
to a ‘disclosure that would endanger the public safety.’). Considerations of public safety are at the
heart of the rationale for recognizing the state secret privilege. However, in Burr the Chief Justice
never formally recognized a privilege nor even used the term, privilege. Id.
8

Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37.

9

See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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privilege. However, the government will resort to the privilege during periods
of international tension. For example, Reynolds was decided at the height of
the Cold War10 and arose during a time of “vigorous preparation for national
defense.”11 Thus, it was certainly no surprise that in the aftermath of 9/11, the
national government began to assert the privilege more frequently.12
The question arises: What are the procedural effects of the government’s
successful claim of the privilege in litigation? If the generalizations of the
Advisory Committee on the proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 509 and
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, quoted at the outset of this article, are accurate, then the
only effects would be that the privileged information becomes unavailable
and the case proceeds without the privileged evidence. A successful privilege
claim would not end the litigation unless the claim deprived either the
prosecution13 or plaintiff 1 4 of sufﬁcient evidence to sustain the initial burden of
production.15 As authority for the generalization, Ellsberg relied on McCormick’s
Handbook of the Law of Evidence (Hornbook Series),16 which is extensively cited

See 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:54, at
862 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter FEDERAL EVIDENCE] (stating the Cold War was “during an era of
heightened fears over communist espionage.”).
10

11

Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.

12

See Report Accused Bush Administration of Exercising “Unprecedented” Secrecy, 76 U.S.L.W.
(BNA) 2139 (Sept. 11, 2007) (“Since 2001, the ‘state secrets’ privilege . . . has been invoked [thirtynine] times, an average of six times per year in [six and a half ] years, which is more than double
the average in the previous [twenty-four] years.”). See also The State Secret Privilege Invoked in Civil
Litigation, supra note 7, at 583–84 (“The executive has invoked the state secret privilege much more
frequently; though the privilege was invoked approximately ﬁve times between 1951 and 1970, it
has been relied upon more than ﬁfty times between 1971 and 1994.”).
13

Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), in order to sustain its burden, the
prosecution must present sufﬁcient evidence to allow a rational trier of fact to ﬁnd the existence
of every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See also 2 EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 2919 (5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter
COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE].
14

In a civil case, to sustain the burden the plaintiff must present sufﬁcient evidence to
support a rational permissive inference of the existence of every element of the cause of action. See
COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, supra note 13, § 2906.
15

The initial burden of production or going forward determines whether the prosecution or
plaintiff has a submissible case, that is, whether the judge will submit the case to the jury rather than
make a peremptory ruling in the defense’s favor. See COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, supra note 13,
§ 2903. In deciding whether the prosecutor or plaintiff has met this burden, the judge assesses the
legal sufﬁciency of the evidence and cannot consider the credibility of the testimony. In contrast,
the ultimate burden of proof is the standard that the trier of fact uses in deciding whether to return
a verdict in the prosecutor’s or plaintiff ’s favor. See COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, supra note 13,
§ 2914. The trier of fact evaluates the factual sufﬁciency of the evidence and may consider credibility.
16
See Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Russo v.
Mitchell, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984), aff ’d, 807 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and cert. denied 484 U.S.
870 (1987) (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
(HORNBOOK SERIES) 233 (Edward W. Cleary ed. 1972)).
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in the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence. In short,
the generalization often appears in both primary and secondary authority.
However, even a cursory review of case law demonstrates the generalization is a
misleading oversimpliﬁcation.
In one of his most famous opinions—United States v. Andolschek 17—Judge
Hand wrote that in federal prosecutions “[t]he government must choose; either
it must leave the transactions in the obscurity from which a trial will draw them,
or it must expose them fully.”18 A decade later, Reynolds echoed Judge Hand
in stating that it would be unconscionable to permit the sovereign to prosecute
while withholding exculpatory evidence.19 Moreover, the proposed Draft of the
Federal Rule of Evidence 509(e) announced:
Effect of Sustaining Claim. If a claim of privilege is sustained in
a proceeding to which the government is a party and it appears
that another party is thereby deprived of material evidence, the
judge shall make any further orders which the interests of justice
require, including striking the testimony of a witness, declaring
a mistrial, ﬁnding against the government upon an issue as to
which the evidence is relevant, or dismissing the action.20
Just as the federal government can initiate a prosecution, it can also be
formally joined as a party in civil litigation. For example, if the government sues
a private party or entity and invokes the state secrets privilege to suppress relevant
evidence in the litigation, the civil defendant can make an argument parallel to
that of an accused claiming a denial of exculpatory evidence. The language of
draft Rule 509(e) applies in civil cases as well as prosecutions. Hence, like an
accused, a civil defendant could seek such relief as a peremptory ﬁnding against
the government on an essential element of the government’s cause of action.
The thorniest problem arises when the government invokes the privilege
in cases in which it is not a party. Some authorities assert that the government
has much broader authority to assert the privilege in civil actions than in

17

United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).

18

Id. at 506.

19

See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953).

20

Order, 56 F.R.D. 183, 252 (1972). Ultimately, Congress decided against adopting
the speciﬁc privilege provisions proposed by the Court and instead enacted Rule 501, which
generally authorizes the federal courts to continue to evolve the privilege doctrine by common-law
methodology based on reason and experience. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Draft Article V of the
Federal Rules of Evidence on Privileges, One of the Most Inﬂuential Pieces of Legislation Never Enacted:
The Strength of the Ingroup Loyalty of the Federal Judiciary, 58 ALA. L. REV. 41 (2006).
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prosecutions.21 When the government is not joined as a party,22 the government
is still entitled to intervene for the purpose of invoking the privilege to protect
a state secret.23 In other words, even when the only litigants are private parties
and entities, the government may intervene and deny the plaintiff, the defendant,
or both parties potential evidence essential to presenting their cases.24 In recent
years, the government has asserted the privilege in cases involving “high-technology
companies, private security ﬁrms, corporations developing infrastructure, and
weapons or aircraft manufacturers.”25
Part II of this article describes the current state of the law governing cases
when the national government has successfully invoked the state secrets privilege
in litigation between private parties.26 Contrary to the generalizations cited by
the Advisory Committee and Ellsberg, in many variations of this situation, the
procedural outcome is not “simply that the evidence is unavailable, as though
a witness had died . . . .”27 Part II also discusses two seminal decisions on state
secrets privilege—Reynolds 28 and Totten v. United States—29 and how the lower
courts have applied those two precedents in civil cases when the government is
not a party. Part II explains that if the government’s successful privilege claim
denies the plaintiff evidence needed to establish a prima facie case and sustain
its burden of production, the plaintiff ’s case will be dismissed. Then in Part III,
this article discusses the effects of those precedents on civil defendants as well as
civil plaintiffs.30
Part IV of this article is a critical evaluation of the current state of the law.31
Part IV begins by reviewing the policy arguments favoring the status quo, which
21

See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 313 n.7 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S.
947 (2007).
See 2 DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL., TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 9:14, at 9–42 (3d ed. 2005)
[hereinafter TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES].
22

23
See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011). See also 26 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5671, at 724 (1992).
24

See, e.g., Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1991);
Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
25
Laura K. Donohue, Opinion, The State-Secrets Defense: A Privilege Too Far Gone, WASH.
P OST , Oct. 8, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/07/
AR2010100705343.html.
26

See infra notes 33–95 and accompanying text.

27

Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Russo v.
Mitchell, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984), aff ’d, 807 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and cert. denied 484 U.S.
870 (1987) (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
(HORNBOOK SERIES) 233 (Edward W. Cleary ed. 1972)).
28

See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).

29

Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).

30

See infra notes 96–185 and accompanying text.

31

See infra notes 186–213 and accompanying text.
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often peremptorily denies the civil plaintiff relief. Later, Part IV critiques those
policy arguments contending that in certain circumstances, when the civil
defendant has a more direct relationship to the government than to the plaintiff,
the court should require the defendant to bear the burden of lost evidence.
There is a powerful argument that in those circumstances, just as a civil plaintiff
is dismissed when the privilege claim precludes him or her from presenting a
prima facie case, a civil defendant should be required to proceed to trial even
if the sustained privilege claim deprives the defendant of evidence relevant to
establishing a true afﬁrmative defense to liability. If, as a matter of policy, the law
has decided to assign the defendant the burdens of pleading, production, and
proof on a factual proposition—that is, to treat the proposition as an afﬁrmative
defense in the case—it is appropriate to require the defendant to bear the burden
of the loss of evidence caused by the government’s privilege claim.
Finally, Part IV constructs a case that the same result ought to obtain
when the privilege claim interferes with the defendant’s ability to present a simple
defense, negating an element of the plaintiff ’s cause of action, but the defendant
has a much stronger relationship with the government than the plaintiff.32
Admittedly, the case for requiring the defendant to shoulder the burden is not
as strong as it is in the case of a true afﬁrmative defense. However, given the
nature of the defendant’s relationship to the sovereign asserting the privilege, the
courts ought to rethink the facile assumption that in these cases, the plaintiff
must almost always suffer a dismissal of the complaint or a summary judgment
for the defense.

II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW—
THE BIAS FAVORING PEREMPTORY VICTORY FOR THE DEFENDANT
As Part I indicated, Subpart A begins by reviewing the two leading Supreme
Court precedents on the state secret privilege, Reynolds and Totten. After considering the decisions separately, Subpart A continues to discuss the interplay
between the decisions. Subpart B then describes the lower court cases examining
the procedural effects when the court applies one or both precedents to restrict a
civil plaintiff ’s or civil defendant’s ability to present its case in a lawsuit in which
the government is not a party.

32
In the case of a true afﬁrmative defense, the defendant can concede the elements of the
prosecutor’s charge or the plaintiff ’s cause of action but proves additional facts that avoid criminal
responsibility or civil liability. The modern afﬁrmative defense evolved from the common-law
“confession and avoidance” pleading. In the case of simple defenses, the defendant attempts to
negate an element of the charge or cause of action. The latter type of defense is sometimes termed
an element-negating traverse. See People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553, 555 (Colo. 2011) (en banc),
cert. denied sub nom, Pickering v. Colorado, 132 S. Ct. 2429 (2012).
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A. Leading Precedent: Reynolds and Totten
1. United States v. Reynolds
As previously stated, in 1953 the Court formally recognized the existence
of the state secrets privilege in Reynolds.33 In that case, six crewmen and three civilian
observers aboard were killed in an Air Force B-29 crash in Waycross, Georgia.
The families of the civilian observers sued the government under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.34 During pretrial discovery, the plaintiffs moved for production
of the Air Force’s ofﬁcial accident report and the surviving crewmembers’
statements. The government moved to quash the motion and cited privilege
for military secrets. The Secretary of the Air Force submitted a letter to the trial
judge. The letter stated: “[I]t has been determined that it would not be in the
public interest to furnish this report.”35 The Secretary later ﬁled a formal privilege
claim, elaborating that “the aircraft in question, together with the personnel on
board, were engaged in a highly secret mission of the Air Force.”36 The Secretary
offered to produce the surviving crewmen for interviews by the plaintiffs. In
addition, the Secretary stated that the crewmen would be permitted to refresh their
memories by reviewing their statements before the interviews. Nevertheless, the
trial judge ordered production. The judge reasoned that by enacting the Federal
Tort Claims Act, Congress impliedly waived the privilege. When the government
refused to comply with the judge’s order, judgment was entered in favor of the
plaintiffs. The intermediate appellate court afﬁrmed. However, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed.
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Vinson, the Court decided to follow
the lead of English case law recognizing the privilege. The Chief Justice conceded
that even the English experience with the doctrine was limited, but he added:
Experience in the past was [sic] has made it common knowledge that air power is one of the most potent weapons in
our scheme of defense, and that newly developing electronic
devices have greatly enhanced the effective use of air power. It
is equally apparent that these electronic devices must be kept
secret if their full military advantage is to be exploited in the
national interests.37

33

See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953).

34

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2015).

35

Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 4.

36

Id.

37

Id. at 10.
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The Chief Justice also commented on the procedures for administering
the doctrine:
The privilege belongs to the Government and must be asserted
by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party.
It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be [a] formal claim
of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has
control of the matter, after actual personal consideration by
that ofﬁcer.38
On the one hand, the Chief Justice indicated that the trial judge must assess the
legitimacy of the privilege claim; the judge may not abdicate control over the
evidence in a case “to the caprice of executive ofﬁcers.”39 On the other hand,
given the vital stake in protecting true state secrets whenever possible, the judge
must make his or her decision “without forcing a disclosure of the very thing
the privilege is designed to protect.”40 When a party seeks discovery and shows a
compelling need for the alleged privileged information, the judge must carefully
scrutinize the government’s claim. However,
It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances
of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of
the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest
of national security, should not be divulged. When this is the
case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court
should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant
to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence,
even by the judge alone, in chambers.41
In Reynolds, the Court upheld the privilege claim and then decided
whether to terminate the litigation or allow the case to proceed.42 Given the speciﬁc
facts in Reynolds, the Court allowed the plaintiff ’s case to proceed.43 In light of
the availability of the surviving witnesses to the plaintiffs, it was not a foregone
conclusion that the exclusion of the privileged information would prevent the
plaintiff from presenting a prima facie case. The Court remanded to allow the
plaintiffs to conduct further discovery and attempt to muster a prima facie

38

Id. at 7–8.

39

Id. at 9–10.

40

Id. at 8.

41

Id. at 10.

42

See generally id. at 7– 8. See also FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 10, § 5:54, at 864.

43

See generally Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10–11. See also Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,
614 F.3d 1070, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
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case with nonprivileged evidence. Rather than pursuing the case to trial, the
plaintiffs eventually settled with the government.44
Although Reynolds is a landmark decision, its essential teachings are few and
limited. Reynolds announced: There is an evidentiary privilege for state secrets;
when the government successfully invokes the privilege, the only direct and
immediate effect is that the judge must exclude the privileged information from
evidence;45 and, when the government is the defendant, the plaintiff ’s case may
proceed if the plaintiff can marshal enough unprivileged evidence to present a
prima face case satisfying the plaintiff ’s initial burden of production.

2. Totten v. United States
Prior to Reynolds, the Court decided Totten. Although Totten 46 never uses
the expression state or military secret, it is one of the Court’s most important
pronouncements on the scope and impact of the doctrine protecting such
secrets. In Totten, the personal representative of William Lloyd’s estate sued the
United States in the Court of Claims. The plaintiff alleged that the decedent
had entered into a contract with President Lincoln to spy for the Union during
the Civil War. In particular, the plaintiff claimed that the President had hired
Lloyd to “proceed South and ascertain the number of troops stationed at different
points in the insurrectionary States, procure plans of forts and fortiﬁcations . . .
and report the facts to the President; for which services he was to be paid $200
a month.”47 The plaintiff contended that although the decedent had performed
the promised services, the President had not paid him the agreed upon

44

See Allen Pusey, March 9, 1953: A State Secrets Doctrine Is Born, A.B.A.J. (Mar. 1, 2015,
1:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_state_secrets_doctrine_is_born_on_
march_9_1953. As a postscript, early this century the plaintiffs’ heirs ﬁled a petition for a writ
of error coram nobis with the Court. In the interim, the Air Force declassiﬁed the accident report
on the crash. According to the heirs’ attorneys, “[t]he accident report . . . contained nothing
remotely like a military secret.” Dahlia Lithwick, Aggressive Use of ‘State Secrets’ Defense Threatens
Judicial Review, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006, at 54; Marcia Coyle, New Light on an Old Defense
of “Secrets,” NAT’L L.J., Mar. 10, 2003, at A1. See also Emily Simpson, Comment, “Nothing Is So
Oppressive as a Secret”: Recommendations for Reforming the State Secrets Privilege, 80 TEMP. L. REV.
561, 561– 62 (2007). But see Marcia Coyle, Air Force Crash: A 1953 Case Echoes in High Court,
NAT’L L.J., June 16, 2003, at 5 (stating “[t]he government . . . contends that there was no fraud:
‘The Secretary [of the Air Force] was legitimately concerned that information about the conﬁdential
equipment and mission of the aircraft might be disclosed if the report and witness statements were
released.’”). Ultimately, the Court issued a one-sentence order denying the motion. David A.
Churchill & Elaine J. Goldenberg, Who Will Guard the Guardians? Revisiting the State Secrets
Privilege of United States v. Reynolds, 72 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2227, 2231 (Oct. 28, 2003).
45

See Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
967 (1998).
46

See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876).

47

Id. at 105–06.
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compensation. The Court of Claims dismissed the petition. In an opinion written
by Justice Field, the Court afﬁrmed the dismissal.
Justice Field did not merely hold the evidence of the spying contract
inadmissible; rather, he held the application of the state secrets privilege
necessitated the automatic dismissal of the plaintiff ’s lawsuit.48 Justice Field
argued that “[b]oth employer and agent must have understood that the lips
of the other were to be for ever sealed respecting the relation of either to the
matter.”49 Furthermore, the Justice enunciated, “as a general principle, that
public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the
trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the
law itself regards as conﬁdential, and respecting which it will not allow the
conﬁdence to be violated.”50 In the Justice’s view, the general principle required
the dismissal of the plaintiff ’s complaint because the existence of the spying
contract explicitly alleged in the complaint was “a fact not to be disclosed.”51
In several subsequent decisions, the Court commented on Totten.52
For example, the Court cited and discussed Totten in Weinberger v. Catholic
Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project 53 in 1981 and Tenet v. Doe 54 in 2005.55
In Weinberger, the plaintiffs alleged the Department of Defense violated the
National Environmental Policy Act by failing to prepare an environmental
impact statement for the storage of nuclear weapons at a Navy facility on Oahu,
Hawaii. The Navy claimed that “[d]ue to national security reasons . . . [it] [could]
neither admit nor deny that it propose[d] to store nuclear weapons at [the
facility].”56 Citing Totten,57 the Court determined that the subject matter of the
lawsuit was “beyond judicial scrutiny,”58 that is, nonjusticiable.59
In Tenet the plaintiffs, husband and wife, alleged the Central Intelligence
Agency (C.I.A.) hired them to perform espionage services during the Cold War.
The plaintiffs claimed the C.I.A. had not given them the promised compensation.
48

See Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1078.

49

Totten, 92 U.S. at 106.

50

Id. at 107.

51

Id.

52

E.g., Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1078.

53

Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981).

54

Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005).

55

See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011).

56

Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 146.

57

Id. at 147.

58

Id. at 146.

59

See Fazaga v. F.B.I, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1035–36 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (explaining Totten to
be a categorical justiciability bar); SSPA, supra note 6, at 686–88 (stating that the application of the
Totten doctrine renders the case nonjusticiable).
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The Court held that Totten barred the suit. As in Totten, “the very subject matter
of the action, a contract to perform espionage, was a matter of state secret.”60
Totten therefore operated as a categorical bar to the plaintiff ’s claim in Tenet. 61
Two recurring motifs emerge from Weinberger and Tenet. First, Totten
applies when, given the nature of the allegations, the litigation of the case
will necessarily result in the disclosure of state secrets. The Court used similar
terminology in Totten 62 and in its discussions of Totten in three later decisions.63
Given the other recurring theme, it is understandable that the Court initially
set the bar that high. The other recurring theme is that when Totten applies, it
triggers a categorical bar,64 rendering the issue nonjusticiable.65 In other words,
the bar is so demanding because the procedural consequence is so drastic. When
Reynolds alone applies, the Court excludes the privileged information but the case
can sometimes proceed on the basis of the remaining unprivileged evidence.66
However, when Totten also comes into play, the judge peremptorily terminates
the litigation.

B. The Interplay of Reynolds and Totten
Although Reynolds and Totten are distinct decisions, it is best to conceive of
them as two points on a continuum.67 The decisions represent two applications
of the broader underlying principle that courts must safeguard vital national
secrets.68 In some instances, the two cases converge.69
Consider a case in which, after its successful assertion of the Reynolds
privilege, the government invokes the spirit of Totten and argues that, if the case
proceeds, there is a signiﬁcant risk that the litigation will result in the disclosure
of privileged information. If the court applied Totten, it would terminate the
litigation only when continuing the case would necessarily lead to such disclosures.

60

Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).

61

Id. at 8–10.

62

See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875).

63

See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 147
(1981); Tenet, 544 U.S. at 8; Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1906 (2011).
64

Tenet, 544 U.S. at 9.

65

Gen. Dynamics, 131 S. Ct. at 1906.

66

See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

67

See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1089 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
68

Id. at 1077 n.3.

See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 509.12,
at 509–10 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE].
69
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Lower courts have yet to deﬁne the precise parameters of the Totten bar.70
However, the lower courts have generally refused to narrowly conﬁne the bar to a
speciﬁc factual context.71 More speciﬁcally, the lower courts have been willing to
terminate litigation even when the litigation would not necessarily result in the
disclosure of privileged information. Rather, the view that has emerged among
the lower courts is that, after sustaining a Reynolds claim, a court ought to end the
litigation when the court is convinced that the litigation will pose an “intolerable,”72
“unacceptable,”73 “unjustiﬁable,”74 “reasonable,”75 or “signiﬁcant”76 possibility77
that there will be an accidental78 or inadvertent79 revelation of privileged
information.80 To be sure, this development relaxes the inevitability standard
announced in Totten. However, the development is a modest extension of the
underlying principle of judicial protection of critical national secrets.
When a Totten argument is made, the trial judge must make a practical81
judgment as to whether it is feasible to proceed.82 The judge should ask: “Is it
realistic83 to think that the privileged and unprivileged evidence can be safely
disentangled84 and separated85 during discovery and trial?” Of course, the trial
judge can resort to procedural measures such as protective orders. However, in
some cases privileged and unprivileged information is so entwined86 that no
combination of protective measures will eliminate or signiﬁcantly reduce the

70

See Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1085.

71

Id. at 1078– 79.

72

Id. at 1083.

73

Id. at 1079, 1088–89. Accord In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2007); id. at
159–60 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting). See also WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note
69, § 509.12, at 509–10.
74

Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1085, 1087.

WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 69, § 509.12, at 509 n.1 (citing Crater Corp.
v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
75

76

Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1088.

77

See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005).

78

See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 154, 158 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).

79

Id.

80

See Tenet, 544 U.S. at 11 (“Even a small chance that some court will order disclosure of a
source’s identity could well impair intelligence gathering and cause sources to ‘close up like a clam.’”
(quoting C.I.A. v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985)).
81

See Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1082, 1084.

82

See id. at 1082, 1087.

83

See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 154, 158 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).

84

See Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1082.

85

Id. at 1083.

86

See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 154, 158 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).
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risk of disclosure.87 For example, the corpus of evidence in a case can constitute
such an interwoven88 mosaic89 that, in the heat of battle, a trial attorney may
probe too far.90 Or, if a witness possesses both privileged and unprivileged
evidence but has only a layperson’s understanding of the dividing line, the witness
may accidentally stray into privileged territory.91
Litigation can be unpredictable.92 When national stakes are high, “[c]ourts are
not required to play with ﬁre and chance . . . disclosure—inadvertent, mistaken,
or even intentional—that would defeat the very purpose for which the privilege
exists.”93 After analyzing the evidence and considering possible protective orders,
the judge may be forced to conclude that the state secret evidence is so central to
the case that any attempt to proceed with litigation will create a signiﬁcant threat
of disclosure.94 In these circumstances, lower courts generally deem the matter
nonjusticiable and deny the litigants “their normal right of access to the formal
dispute resolution forum provided by the sovereign.”95

III. THE APPLICATION OF PRECEDENT AND THE EFFECTS
ON CIVIL PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS
It may seem Draconian to deny a civil litigant his or her day in court,96 but
lower courts often apply Reynolds and Totten in a fashion that leads to that result.
After ﬁrst reviewing the case law determining the impact of the government’s
successful privilege claim on civil plaintiffs, we shall turn to the decisions
considering the impact on civil defendants.

87

See, e.g., Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1089; Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 967 (1998).
88

See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 151 (majority opinion).

89

See Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1082.

90

See id. at 1088. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th
Cir. 1985).
91
See generally Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1089. See also In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 154, 159
(Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).
92

E.g., Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1089.

93

Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 344 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom. Sterling v. Goss,
546 U.S. 1093 (2006).
94

See, e.g., Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1081; In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 151 (D.C. Cir.
2007); id. at 154, 158 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).
95
In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 157 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting
Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 279 (4th Cir. 1980)).
96

See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 151 (majority opinion).
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A. Three Categories of Cases Analyzing the Impact on Civil Plaintiffs
The First Category.
In the ﬁrst category, even after sustaining the government’s privilege claim,
the trial judge concludes both that the plaintiff has a prima facie case, and
that allowing the plaintiff to proceed to present his or her case does not pose a
signiﬁcant risk of inadvertent disclosure of privileged information. Here, neither
Reynolds nor Totten calls for a peremptory dismissal of the plaintiff ’s claim. In re
Sealed Case 97 is illustrative.
In In re Sealed Case, Horn, a Drug Enforcement Agency (D.E.A.) employee,
sued a State Department ofﬁcial for unconstitutional electronic surveillance.
The surveillance allegedly occurred in Burma while the plaintiff was the D.E.A.’s
country attaché. The government intervened and asserted the state secrets
privilege for two Inspector General investigations of the surveillance. The trial
judge sustained the privilege claim and dismissed the complaint.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed. Over a forceful dissent by Judge Brown,98 the majority found that
“even after evidence relating to covert operatives, organizational structure
and functions, and intelligence-gathering sources, methods, and capabilities
is stricken from the proceedings under the state secrets privilege, Horn ha[d]
alleged sufﬁcient facts” to establish a prima facie case.99 The court also rejected
the government’s Totten100 argument; relying on Reynolds,101 the court explained
that there was only a minimal risk of inadvertent disclosure because the privileged
evidence was “peripheral to what remains of Horn’s prima facie case.”102
In dissent, Judge Brown warned: “The few remaining unprivileged facts
comprising Horn’s prima facie case are islands surrounded by a sea of privileged
material.”103 In his view, the privileged and unprivileged information were “so
entwined”104 that there was a “great”105 risk that lay witnesses who possessed
secrets, but did not comprehend the scope of the privilege, would divulge

97

See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

98

See id. at 154 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting) (“I am less sanguine than the majority
that the unprivileged facts actually sufﬁce to make a prima facie showing.”).
99

In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 148 (majority opinion).

100

See id. at 151.

101

Id.

102

Id. at 152.

103

Id. at 158 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).

104

Id. at 159.

105

Id.
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privileged information on direct or cross examination.106 The majority countered
by quoting the Central Intelligence Director’s declaration, explicitly conceding
that some of the most important state secrets “can be segregated . . . at no risk
to U.S. national security.”107 The majority concluded it was premature for the
lower court to assume that the risk of inadvertent disclosure in future proceedings
was so considerable that the court needed to dismiss the plaintiff ’s complaint.108

The Second Category.
In this category of cases, the trial judges dismissed the plaintiff ’s complaint
because, after a successful privilege claim by the government, the plaintiff can no
longer produce a prima facie case. Ellsberg v. Mitchell is one example. In Ellsberg,109
the plaintiffs—the former defendants and attorneys of the Pentagon Papers—
were prosecuted for their involvement in the unauthorized release of classiﬁed
materials regarding the Vietnam War. The plaintiffs ﬁled a civil complaint against
the government and alleged the government subjected them to unconstitutional
electronic surveillance. The government conceded it used surveillance on some
of the plaintiffs. However, the government invoked the state secrets privilege and
refused to admit or deny if it conducted electronic surveillance on the remaining
plaintiffs. The trial judge dismissed all of the claims.
The appellate court afﬁrmed the dismissal of the claims of the plaintiffs
whom the government did not admit to using surveillance on.110 Those plaintiffs
argued that the suppressed evidence would have shown the government
subjected them to electronic surveillance but “were manifestly unable to make
out a prima facie case without the requested information.”111 As the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed, “[i]f, after [the government’s successful
Reynolds claim], the plaintiff cannot prove the prima facie elements of her claim
with nonprivileged evidence, then the court may dismiss her claim as it would
with any plaintiff who cannot prove her case.”112 There is judicial consensus that
in this factual situation, dismissal is mandatory.113
106

Id.

107

Id. at 152 (majority opinion).

108

See id. at 153.

109

Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Russo v. Mitchell,
465 U.S. 1038 (1984), aff ’d, 807 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and cert. denied 484 U.S. 870 (1987).
110

See id. at 65.

111

Id.

112

Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 967 (1998).

113
See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 153 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991). See also TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGES, supra note 22, § 9:14, at 9–45 (3d ed. 2005); FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 10, § 5:54,
at 864; The State Secret Privilege Invoked in Civil Litigation, supra note 7, at 577, 580.
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The Third Category.
In the third category of cases, despite the government’s Reynolds claim, the
plaintiff still had a prima facie case; but under Totten, the defense persuades the
judge that permitting the plaintiff ’s case to proceed will present an unacceptable
risk of disclosing privileged information. Kasza v. Browner 114 is on point. In
Kasza, the former workers at an Air Force facility and one worker’s widow sued
the Secretary of Defense for damages caused by the mishandling of hazardous
material at the facility. The government made a formal privilege claim to suppress
“[s]ecurity sensitive environmental data.”115 After the trial judge sustained the
claim, the judge entered summary judgment for the defendant.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit afﬁrmed in part. The court
noted that even after privileged evidence is “completely removed from the case”116
the “plaintiff ’s case [may] go[] forward based on evidence not covered by the
privilege.”117 However, the court also observed that, even when the plaintiff has
enough unprivileged evidence to piece together a prima facie case, the judge may
dismiss the complaint on Totten grounds. At one point during the discussion of
that issue, the court referred to the traditional inevitability standard.118 However,
in another passage the court invoked the laxer, modern standard, namely, whether
allowing the plaintiff to proceed would create a reasonable danger of exposure
of state secrets.119 The court alluded to the mosaic analogy120 several times and
stressed the practical difﬁculty of disentangling the classiﬁed information from
the seemingly innocuous evidence.121 The court stated,
[A]ny attempt on the part of the plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case would so threaten disclosure of state secrets that the
overriding interest of the United States and the preservation of
its state secrets that the overriding interest of the United States
and the preservation of its state secrets precludes any further
attempt to pursue this litigation.122

114

See Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 967 (1998).

115

Id. at 1163 (alteration in original).

116

Id. at 1166.

117

Id.

118

See id.

119

See id.

120

See id.

121

Id.

122

Id. at 1170 (citation omitted).
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In a given case, if the privileged and unprivileged evidence are inextricably linked,
any attempt by the plaintiff to establish his or her case can risk compromising the
privileged state secrets.123
So far, we have examined three variations of the potential impact of a successful government privilege claim on private litigants’ cases. All of the cases
focused on the effect of the privilege claim on the plaintiff ’s case; in these
variations, the courts inquired into whether the claim precluded the plaintiff
from presenting a prima facie case or proceeding without a signiﬁcant risk for
inadvertent disclosure. In two of the three situations, under Reynolds and Totten,
the court dismissed the plaintiff ’s lawsuit.
We now turn to the decisions considering the impact of a successful
claim on the defendant’s case. Here again, we shall see that according to lower
courts, a claim’s effect on a defendant’s case can warrant peremptorily ruling
against the plaintiff. In these cases, the procedure is that the court enters summary judgment for the defense rather than dismissing the plaintiff ’s complaint.124
As we shall see, in the current state of the law, even when the impact of the
privilege claim on a plaintiff ’s case does not necessitate dismissal, the defense may
sometimes prevail by pointing to the impact of the claim on the defense’s ability
to rebut the plaintiff ’s evidence.

B. Four Categories of Cases Analyzing the Impact on Civil Defendants
As was true with the case law addressing the impact of a successful privilege
claim on the plaintiff ’s case, the decisions analyzing the impact of such a claim on
the defendant’s case can be sorted into several distinct categories.

The First Category.
In the ﬁrst category, the defendant’s argument is the strongest for a
peremptory victory because the privileged evidence clearly establishes that the
defendant has a meritorious defense to liability. The leading case is Molerio v.
F.B.I., a 1984 United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
decision authored by then Judge Scalia.125 The plaintiff—a criminal investigator
for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.)—applied to be a Federal
Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) special agent. As an I.N.S. investigator, the
plaintiff already held a secret security clearance. To become an F.B.I. agent, the

See WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 69, § 509.12, at 509–10 n.6 (citing Bareford
v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1029 (1993)).
123

124
See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 153 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1160;
Molerio v. F.B.I., 749 F.2d 815, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
125

Molerio, 749 F.2d at 818.
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plaintiff needed to qualify for a Top Secret level clearance. The plaintiff passed the
initial F.B.I. interview and then underwent a background investigation to obtain
Top Secret clearance. The plaintiff was told that the background investigation
turned up “something in New York having to do with his family”126 and that
he would have to undergo a second interview. The second interview touched
on family relationships and political beliefs.127 The plaintiff ’s father, Dagoberto,
previously belonged to a group that supported the Castro revolution128 and
participated in the United States Socialist Worker’s Party, which was involved in
litigation with the F.B.I.129 Ultimately, the F.B.I. informed the plaintiff that they
would not hire him. A civil case ensued.
The plaintiff alleged that the F.B.I. discriminated against him because he
was Hispanic and based the hiring decision on his father’s activities, which were
protected by the First Amendment. After ﬁling the complaint, the plaintiff began
pretrial discovery. During discovery, the government refused to produce certain
documents about the background investigation of the plaintiff. The government
asserted that revealing the information would “jeopardize or interfere with
National-State Secrets or the National Security.”130 The district court dismissed
the complaint.
On appeal, Judge Scalia upheld the district court’s decision. Early in his
analysis, the judge concluded that the district court had correctly dismissed
the claim based on alleged racial discrimination. Judge Scalia found that the
plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination. In
its unprivileged interrogatory answers, the F.B.I. admitted that in processing the
plaintiff ’s job application, it:
[C]onsidered among other things the fact that he had relatives
in Cuba, and that it generally “would attach special weight to
the fact that an applicant had relatives residing in any foreign
country controlled by a government whose interests or policies
are hostile or inconsistent with those of the United States.”131
However, without more, the unprivileged evidence was legally insufﬁcient to
prove that the F.B.I. had discriminated against the plaintiff because he was
Hispanic. In the judge’s mind the unprivileged evidence showed only that the
government had treated the plaintiff in the same fashion that it would have treated

126

Id. at 819.

127

Id.

128

Id.

129

Id. at 825.

130

Id. at 819.

131

Id. at 823.
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an applicant with relatives living in East Germany, Iran, or North Vietnam.132
As the initial section of Subpart B noted, the lower courts agree that when the
government’s successful privilege claim deprives the plaintiff of evidence needed
to establish a prima facie case, the defense is entitled to a peremptory victory.
The judge then turned to the plaintiff ’s second claim that the F.B.I. had
acted unconstitutionally by denying his application on the basis of his father’s
First Amendment activity. Judge Scalia was willing to assume arguendo that the
plaintiff had standing to raise his father’s constitutional rights as a ground for
relief.133 Next, the judge distinguished the plaintiff ’s First Amendment claim from
the racial discrimination claim. While the judge found that the plaintiff did not
have a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the judge stated the “appellant
had made a circumstantial case permitting the inference that his father’s political
activities were a ‘substantial factor’—or, to put it in other words, . . . a ‘motivating
factor’” in the F.B.I.’s decision not to hire him.134
Nevertheless, Judge Scalia denied relief. He wrote forcefully that the judges’
review of the government’s state secret submission had convinced them that the
F.B.I. had a good defense to the plaintiff ’s prima facie case:
[W]e honored the invocation of that privilege because we satisﬁed
ourselves that the in camera afﬁdavit set forth the genuine reason
for denial of employment, and that that reason could not be
disclosed without risking impairment of the national security.
As a result of that necessary process, the court knows that the
reason Daniel Molerio was not hired had nothing to do with
Dagoberto Molerio’s assertion of First Amendment rights.
Although there may be enough circumstantial evidence to
permit a jury to come to that erroneous conclusion, it would be a
mockery of justice for the court—knowing the erroneousness—
to participate in that exercise . . . . [F]urther activity in this
case would involve an attempt, however well intentioned, to
convince the jury of a falsehood. [A]s a necessary consequence
of our in camera consideration of the state secrets privilege, we
have satisﬁed ourselves as to the reason for the Bureau’s failure
to hire Molerio; and since that reason does not implicate any
First Amendment concerns; this count of the complaint was
properly dismissed.135

132

Id.

133

See id. at 824.

134

Id. at 825 (citation omitted).

135

Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2016

19

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 16 [2016], No. 1, Art. 1

20

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 16

Molerio is an exceptional case that sets a high threshold for dismissal.136 In
Molerio, the government’s assertion of the privilege did not merely interfere with
the defendant’s ability to present a colorable,137 plausible,138 possible,139 or
potential140 defense. Rather, the government’s state secret submission was
so powerful that it established that the defendants were deprived of a truly
dispositive defense141—a defense that had been veriﬁed142 by the court’s careful
review of the submission. “[I]pso facto” the submission showed that the defense
was meritorious.143 The submission was so strong that the “truthful state
of affairs”144 would lead to a defense verdict, while a plaintiff ’s verdict would
represent “an erroneous result”145 and a miscarriage of justice.

The Second Category.
In the second category of cases the defense’s argument is the weakest. For
this category, assume the plaintiff has run the gauntlet of all cases discussing the
impact of the privilege claim on the plaintiff ’s case. In particular assume that
after the privilege assertion, the plaintiff has sufﬁcient evidence to make out a
prima facie case and that the privileged and unprivileged evidence are so
segregable that permitting the plaintiff to proceed will not create a signiﬁcant
risk of disclosure. At this point in the analysis, neither Reynolds nor Totten
dictates dismissal.
Additionally, suppose the court concludes that the privilege claim does not
signiﬁcantly hamper the defense’s ability to either rebut the plaintiff ’s prima
facie case, or establish an afﬁrmative defense. In these circumstances, neither
Reynolds nor Totten nor Molerio justiﬁes entering summary judgment for the
defendant and summarily terminating the litigation.

The Third Category.
The third category of cases overlaps with the second. In the second category,
Totten did not present an insuperable barrier to allowing the litigation to
136

See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 154–55, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting) (explaining Molerio was an “easy case” which satisﬁed a “severe” standard).
137
See id. at 150 (majority opinion). See also S.E.C. v. Nacchio, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168
(D.Colo. 2009) (stating the defense must be “more than merely colorable.”).
138

See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 149–50.

139

Id. at 149.

140

Id. at 150.

141

See id. at 149; id. at 154–55 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).

142

See id. at 153 (majority opinion).

143

Molerio v. F.B.I., 749 F.2d 815, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

144
145

In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 151.
Id.; see also Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991).
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proceed. In that category, the judge concluded the privileged and unprivileged
evidence were sufﬁciently separable that with appropriate protective orders, it was
reasonably safe to proceed with discovery and trial. However, the third category
of cases supposes that after realistically appraising the case, the judge reaches a
contrary conclusion. One example is General Dynamics Corp. v. United States.
In General Dynamics,146 the government claimed the defendant-corporation
breached a contract to develop an A-12 stealth aircraft for the Navy. General
Dynamics raised a superior knowledge afﬁrmative defense. The afﬁrmative
defense was supported because case law “recognized a governmental obligation
not to mislead contractors about, or silently withhold, its ‘superior knowledge’ of
difﬁcult-to-discover information ‘vital’ to contractual performance.”147 General
Dynamics alleged the government did not share the superior knowledge gained
from prior stealth projects.148 The government responded by making a successful
state secrets claim for its information about stealth technology.
The Court found General Dynamics “brought forward enough unprivileged evidence to ‘make a prima facie showing’” of its defense.149 However,
the Court invoked Totten to deny General Dynamics relief. Initially, the Court
mentioned the original, strict Totten inevitability standard: “Where liability
depends upon the validity of a plausible superior-knowledge [afﬁrmative]
defense, and when full litigation of that defense ‘would inevitably lead to the
disclosure of ’ state secrets, neither party can obtain judicial relief.”150 Then, the
Court turned to the more relaxed and modern version of the Totten standard. The
Court commented that:
Every document request or question to a witness would risk
further disclosure, since both sides have an incentive to probe
up to the boundaries of state secrets. State secrets can also
be indirectly disclosed. Each assertion of the privilege can
provide another clue about the Government’s covert programs
or capabilities.151
Similarly, in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,152 a decision from the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit involving the Central Intelligence Agency’s

146

See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011).

147

Id. at 1904.

148

See id.

149

Id. at 1906.

150

Id. at 1907 (citation omitted).

151

Id.

152

Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 2442 (2011).
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clandestine program of extraordinary rendition of suspected terrorists, the court
employed the modern, relaxed version of the Totten standard. There, the plaintiff,
an Egyptian national, alleged that the defendant-corporation assisted the C.I.A.
in transferring him to a foreign country for detention and interrogation. The
government asserted its state secrets privilege to suppress privileged information
about the rendition program. The defendant sought dismissal on the ground
that the successful privilege claim interfered with its ability to present a defense.
Rather than demanding a showing of inevitable disclosure, the court remarked:
[T]here is no feasible way to litigate Jeppesen’s alleged
liability without creating an unjustiﬁable risk of divulging state
secrets . . . . Because the facts underlying the plaintiffs’ claims
are so infused with these secrets, any plausible effort by Jeppesen
to defend against them would create an unjustiﬁable risk of
revealing state secrets, even if plaintiffs could make a prima facie
case on one or more claims with unprivileged evidence.153
As support for the decision, the court cited to several contemporary cases using
standards such as “an undue threat that privileged information will be disclosed,”
“a signiﬁcant risk,” and an “unacceptably high” risk154 rather than inevitability.
Hence, even when the plaintiff has enough unprivileged evidence to present a
prima facie case and the government’s submission falls short of triggering Molerio,
the defendant can prevail by demonstrating that its attempt to present rebuttal
evidence will pose a substantial risk of revealing privileged information. This is
true especially if the court applies the modern, relaxed version of the Totten
standard; under that standard, a risk of that magnitude will trigger a nonjusticiable bar, leading to a peremptory victory for the defense.

The Fourth Category.
The paradigmatic example of the ﬁrst category of cases is Molerio.155 There,
the facts were so “extreme”156 that it was a relatively easy case for the court.157
As the same circuit court observed two decades later, in Molerio, the defense
was not merely “plausible,”158 “possible,”159 or “potential.”160 The government’s
153

Id. at 1087–88.

154

Id. at 1088–89.

155

Molerio v. F.B.I., 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

156

See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 154–55 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting).
157

Id.

158

Id. at 149–50 (majority opinion).

159

Id. at 149.

160

Id. at 150.
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submission was so strong and credible that the defense was dispositive.161 The
submission convinced Judge Scalia and his colleagues that they knew the real
reason why the F.B.I. had not hired Molerio and that the reason had nothing
to do with his father’s constitutionally protected political activities.162 Although
Molerio had enough unprivileged, circumstantial evidence to make out a
prima facie case,163 a verdict for the plaintiff would have been “erroneous”164
and “a mockery of justice.”165 In the fourth category of cases, the courts go
beyond Molerio and enters summary judgment for the defendant when the
government’s successful claim prevents the defendant from advancing a merely
plausible defense.
To be frank, there is only a small body of case law exploring the distinction
between the ﬁrst and fourth categories. The court of appeals cases that have
addressed the distinction166 are split. One line of authority insists that the
court declare a peremptory victory for the defense only when the facts satisfy
the Molerio benchmark. The proponents of this view point to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decision In re
Sealed Case 167 and some broad dicta by the same court from Ellsberg for
support.168 In Molerio, Judge Scalia stopped short of holding that the defense
is entitled to summary judgment only when the facts are as extreme as those in
that case. Yet, a number of subsequent decisions have treated Molerio as a “new
baseline for dismissal.”169
A competing line of authority holds that the defendant can obtain summary
judgment when the government’s successful privilege claim interferes with a
defense that is merely plausible and not dispositive. As previously stated, only
a few courts have even addressed this issue. However, the prevailing view is that
interference with a plausible or potential defense sufﬁces.170 Indeed, it appears that

161

See id. at 149.

162

See Molerio v. F.B.I., 749 F.2d 815, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

163

Id.

164

Id.

165

Id.

166

See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 154, 156 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).

167

Id. at 149–51 (majority opinion).

168

See Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Russo v.
Mitchell, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984), aff ’d, 807 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and cert. denied 484 U.S.
870 (1987); In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 154, 155–56 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting) (discussing the dicta in Ellsberg).
169

In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 155 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).

170

Id. at 156.
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no other circuit has taken the position that only interference with a dispositive
defense warrants dismissal.171
The prevailing view enjoys substantial support in case law. In the Court’s
most recent state secret case, General Dynamics,172 Judge Scalia authored the
opinion, as he did in Molerio. In the text of his opinion, the Justice referred to
interference with a plausible superior-knowledge afﬁrmative defense.173 Other
lower courts have expressly used the same adjective.174 Still other courts175 and
treatise writers176 refer generally to a valid defense without differentiating between
plausible and dispositive defenses.
Advocates of the majority view advance a defensible policy rationale for
their position. For instance, assume that the defense is plausible, but the facts
are not so strong that the defense is dispositive, as in Molerio. It can be argued
that when the invocation of the state secrets privilege has obscured highly
relevant facts, there will necessarily be grave doubts about the reliability of any
judgment for the plaintiff.177 The restriction of the defense’s ability to rebut178
the plaintiff ’s prima facie case or prove up an afﬁrmative defense could easily
distort179 the outcome and lead to a substantive injustice. The possibility of such
injustice is acute when the defense in question is a true afﬁrmative defense180
rather than a simple defense that merely negates an element of the plaintiff ’s
prima facie case.
If the judge restricts a mere simple defense, the defense still has a hope for
victory: A scheduled plaintiff ’s witness may not appear for trial, the witness
might unexpectedly forget critical testimony, or the jury could ﬁnd the witness’s

171

Id.

172

Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011).

173

Id. at 1907.

174

See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
175
See Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 967
(1998); Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991).
176
See TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES, supra note 22, § 9:14, at 9–45; FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGES, supra note 1, § 5:14, at 539.
177
See Gen. Dynamics, 131 S. Ct. at 1910 (stating “too many of the relevant facts remained
obscured by the state-secret privilege to enable a reliable judgment.”).
178

See FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 10, § 5:54, at 864 n.28.

179

See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 154, 157 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting).
180
In General Dynamics, the Court described General Dynamics’ superior-knowledge
contention as an “afﬁrmative defense.” General Dynamics, 131 S. Ct. at 1903. See also FEDERAL
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES, supra note 1, § 5:14, at 540 n.21 (discussing General Dynamics);
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 69, § 509.12, at 509–11 (discussing General Dynamics).
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demeanor unconvincing. In contrast, the consequences for the defense are far
more radical when the judge bars a true afﬁrmative defense. One reason is that
the jury learns about true afﬁrmative defenses from the judge’s instructions.181
However, if the defense is barred, there will be no instruction and the jury will
not learn about a potential defense to the plaintiff ’s prima facie case. Furthermore, if the defense offers an item of evidence that pertains only to an element
of the barred afﬁrmative defense, on an appropriate objection, the judge will
exclude the evidence as irrelevant.182
In sum, when we earlier considered the impact of a government privilege
claim on a plaintiff ’s case, we found that, in two of the three variations of the
problem, the lower courts dismissed the plaintiff ’s lawsuit. After a review of the
four categories of cases impacting claims on the defendant’s cases, in three of
the four categories, the defense obtained a peremptory victory. In most of these
categories of cases, when the government successfully asserts the state secrets
privilege, the plaintiff ’s efforts will be unavailing. Not only will the plaintiff fail
to obtain a favorable verdict but also the trial judge will declare a peremptory
victory for the defense and preclude the plaintiff from either conducting discovery
or trying the case. These decisions show that the case law tilts signiﬁcantly in
favor of maintaining the status quo ante; in effect, the court leaves the parties
where it found them before the plaintiff ﬁled suit.183 Finally, in most of the cases,
even though the plaintiff may have sufﬁcient unprivileged evidence to establish a
prima facie case, the court treats the dispute as “nonjusticiable.”184 In the words of
the poet T.S. Eliot, it is the plaintiff who dares to “[d]isturb the universe”185 and
endeavors to change the legal status quo.

IV. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Part III demonstrated that the current state of the law displays a pronounced
bias in favor of a peremptory victory for the defense. It makes little difference
whether the government’s state secret claim affects the plaintiff ’s case or the
defendant’s case. Part III pointed out that in most categories of cases, the
outcome is either a dismissal of the plaintiff ’s complaint or the entry of summary
judgment for the defendant. That outcome is especially curious when it is driven
by the effect of the government’s claim on the defense case. It is one thing to say
that the plaintiff must bear the burden when the government’s privilege claim
affects the plaintiff ’s ability to marshal a prima facie case or present a case without

See 3A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE
§§ 150:80–84, 155:50–53 (6th ed. 2012).
181

AND

INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL

182

See FED R. EVID. 401.

183

See Gen. Dynamics, 131 S. Ct. at 1907, 1909.

184

Id. at 1908; see FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES, supra note 1, § 5:14, at 540 n.21.

185

T.S. ELIOT, THE LOVE SONG OF J. ALFRED PRUFROCK (1920).
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creating a signiﬁcant risk of reveling privileged information. It is quite another
matter to say that the plaintiff should suffer a peremptory defeat when the
government’s privilege claim handicaps the defense’s ability to rebut the plaintiff ’s
case or mount an afﬁrmative defense. Logic certainly does not dictate that the
plaintiff must bear the burden when the privilege claim restricts the defense’s
capacity to attack the plaintiff ’s case. Yet, there could be a policy justiﬁcation for
allocating the burden to the plaintiff.
The ﬁrst sub-section of Part IV reviews the policy arguments that have been
advanced to justify the above-mentioned allocation. The second sub-section
critiques those arguments and ultimately concludes that the current state of the
law must be reformed. At the very least, in one set of circumstances, the burden
ought to be shifted to the defendant, namely, when: (1) the plaintiff has sufﬁcient
unprivileged evidence to present a prima facie case, (2) proceeding does not
pose a signiﬁcant Totten concern about the inadvertent disclosure of privileged
material during discovery or trial, (3) the privilege claim affects the defense’s
ability to develop an afﬁrmative defense, and (4) unlike the plaintiff, the
defendant had such a close relationship to the government that the defendant
could have anticipated that a privilege claim would interfere with the performance of the defendant’s obligations to the plaintiff. In the initial sub-section
of Part IV, the factual proposition in question is an afﬁrmative defense precisely
because the law has made the decision that a policy or combination of policies
warrants assigning the defendant the burdens of pleading, production, and proof
on the issue. Even after the government’s privilege claim, those policies persist.
The second sub-section of Part IV points out that there is a plausible
argument for shifting the burden in the case of simple defenses when there is a
close relationship between the defendant and the sovereign asserting the privilege.
In this setting, the argument for requiring the defendant to bear the burden is
not as strong as in the case of afﬁrmative defenses. Ultimately the question is of
policy: In allocating the risk between the plaintiff and the defendant, does the
defendant’s more intimate relationship with the sovereign serve as a principled
basis for assigning the risk to the defendant?
It must be emphasized that if the government’s privilege claim interferes with
the defendant’s ability to present a simple defense or to mount a true afﬁrmative
defense, the burden should not be shifted to the defense in the sense that the
court declares a peremptory victory for the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff ought
to proceed with discovery and trial even though the privilege claim has
disadvantaged the defense. Even if the plaintiff is allowed to proceed, the ﬁnal
outcome may not be a plaintiff ’s verdict. This reform leaves both Totten and
Molerio undisturbed. But at least in some cases when the defensive theory is
merely plausible, not dispositive as it was in Molerio, the courts should consider
granting the plaintiff the right to proceed.
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A. Policy Arguments Favoring the Current State of Law
In General Dynamics,186 the Court presented two broad policy arguments
for withholding judicial intervention when the government’s successful privilege
claim frustrated a contractor’s ability to mount an afﬁrmative defense. The ﬁrst
argument rests on an analogy to contract law. Justice Scalia wrote: “Judicial
refusal to enforce promises contrary to public policy . . . is not unknown to the
common law, and the traditional course is to leave the parties where they stood
when they knocked on the courthouse door.”187 Quoting the Second Restatement
of Contracts, the Justice explained that in such situations, courts award the
plaintiff neither damages for prospective proﬁts nor restitution for beneﬁts
previously conferred on the defendant.188 Rather, the government’s successful
assertion of the privilege can render the contract “unenforceable.”189 The very
notion of unenforceability is that the court refuses to intervene and withholds its
coercive, remedial machinery.190
The second argument is that it is unsound to attempt to separate a
plaintiff ’s offensive claim from the defendant’s responsive argument. In the
Justice’s words: “It is claims and defenses together that establish the justiﬁcation,
or lack of justiﬁcation, for judicial relief; and when public policy precludes
judicial intervention for the one it should preclude judicial intervention for
the other as well.”191 On the facts in General Dynamics, the result did not strike
the Justice as unfair, since “[b]oth parties—the Government no less than [the
private] petitioners—must have assumed the risk that state secrets would prevent
the adjudication of claims of inadequate performance.”192 The essential purpose
of a lawsuit is to decide the merits of the parties’ dispute. The argument runs that
if a fair determination of the merits requires an analysis of the claim as well as an
evaluation of the defense, whenever a privilege claim prevents a full airing of the
merits—due to its impact on either the claim or defense—the lawsuit becomes
nonjusticiable and must be terminated.

B. The Policy Arguments Favoring the Proposed Reform
Although the policy arguments advanced in General Dynamics have merit,
it is submitted that in the ﬁnal analysis those arguments should not stand in the
way of adopting the proposed reform.

186

Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011).

187

Id. at 1907.

188

Id.

189

Id. at 1910.

190

Id. at 1907.

191

Id.

192

Id. at 1909.
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1. The Unfairness of Attempting to Separate Plaintiff ’s Claim from the
Defense—Afﬁrmative Defenses
Assuming all four circumstances mentioned at the outset of Part IV are present,
it is undeniable that in some cases the evidence relating to the claim is closely
related to the evidence tending to establish the defense. When, in a given case,
the plaintiff ’s unprivileged evidence and the privileged evidence are intricately
interwoven, Totten may come into play. Totten may apply because allowing the
plaintiff to proceed will give rise to a signiﬁcant risk that privileged evidence
will be inadvertently exposed at trial. However, now assume that the defendant
objects on the ground that the privilege claim interferes with a plausible valid
defense rather than under Totten. These hypothesized circumstances do not raise
signiﬁcant Totten concerns.
In litigation, courts routinely sort through the facts determining the merits
of cases, and assign the facts to one side or the other. They do so to determine
the burden of pleading,193 the initial burden of production or going forward,194
and the ultimate burden of proof.195 In doing so, courts consider such factors as
the relative probability of the occurrence of certain types of events, the parties’
respective access to the information in question, and policy preferences for
particular litigation outcomes.196
The allocation of these burdens can have dramatic impacts during litigation.
If a court assigns a fact to the defendant and characterizes it as an afﬁrmative
defense, the defendant’s failure to mention the defense in his or her answer
may altogether preclude the defendant from raising the argument during the
litigation.197 Likewise, even when the defendant properly pleads an afﬁrmative
defense, the judge can refuse to instruct the jury on the defense if, at trial, the
defendant does not present sufﬁcient evidence to sustain his or her initial burden
of production on the factual proposition.198 The original policy decision to assign
the defense a burden of pleading, production, or proof on a proposition can be
outcome determinative: The defense could lose because of the assignment of one
of the three burdens.

See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.20 (4th ed. 2005); 5B CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1270, 1274 (3d ed. 1998).
193

See RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS
STATUTES 760 (7th ed. 2012) [hereinafter EVIDENCE].
194

AND

195

See EVIDENCE, supra note 194, at 789–92.

196

See EVIDENCE, supra note 194, at 791.

197

See supra note 193 and accompanying text.

198

See EVIDENCE, supra note 194, at 762–63.
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If the relevant policy factors were originally weighty enough to justify
assigning the burden to the defense and in certain circumstances result in a
plaintiff ’s victory, the defendant should arguably continue to bear the burden—
and the consequent risk of a plaintiff ’s victory—when a government privilege
claim interferes with the defense’s ability to develop the defense at trial. Earlier in
the lawsuit, the policy factors were sufﬁciently important to warrant allocating the
burdens to the defense, and the subsequent government privilege claim neither
extinguished those policies nor diminished their legitimacy.
It might be argued here that the defense’s inability is not due to the defendant’s own conduct, but rather the result of the government’s intervention.
However, as previously stated, the proposed reform posits that the defendant
has a closer relationship to the government than the plaintiff. When the defendant has such a relationship, that relationship cuts in favor of continuing to assign
the burden to the defense not only in a formal sense but also in a practical sense.
The defense ought to face the risk of a plaintiff ’s verdict if the case proceeds to trial
although the privilege claim has handicapped the defense. Thus, a policy choice
must be made as between the plaintiff and the defendant, and that relationship is
a legitimate basis for assigning the risk to the defendant.

2. Analogy to Contract Law—Simple Defenses
The preceding paragraphs discussed the factual situation in which all four
circumstances listed at the outset of Part IV are present, including the third
circumstance of the government’s privilege claim restricting the defendant’s
ability to present a true afﬁrmative defense. In that situation, the fourth
salient circumstance, cutting in favor of continuing to assign the burden to the
defense, is the defendant’s close relationship with the sovereign making the claim.
The same policy consideration can come into play when the privilege claim
impinges on the defendant’s ability to advance a simple defense based on evidence
that negates an element of the plaintiff ’s cause of action. The existence of the
relationship between the defendant and the government bears directly on the
contract law analogy of General Dynamics. There, the Court was certainly correct
in stating that in some situations when a court deems a contract unenforceable,
the court must leave the parties where it found them. The classic example is
the illegal contract doctrine.199 As the Court indicated in General Dynamics, if
a contract is illegal because it violates a statute or common-law policy, the court
leaves the parties where it found them. The common-law maxim is, in pari delicto
potior est conditio defendentis—in the case of equal fault, the condition of the
defendant party is the better one.200 In other words, the court dismisses the suit,
and the defense wins a peremptory victory. Further, in the typical illegal contract

199

See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 22 (7th ed. 2014) [hereinafter CONTRACTS].

200

See CONTRACTS, supra note 199, § 22.1, at 773.
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case, the court will deem the parties equally at fault in a legal sense, since both
parties are required to know the law.201
Although that common-law maxim is the starting point for analysis
under the illegal contract doctrine, the maxim is not the end of the analysis.
Even when both parties are technically at fault in the sense that they ought to
have known the law was violated by their agreement, courts inquire further
to determine whether both parties were equally blameworthy in a broader
sense.202 Morally, one party might be more responsible.203 If so, the other party
is deemed “not in pari delicto” and may obtain relief.204 As previously stated in
its opinion, the General Dynamics Court appealed to the Second Restatement of
Contracts.205 Another provision of the same Restatement limits the scope of the
illegal contract doctrine and expressly states that a party to an illegal contract may
obtain relief when he or she was “excusably ignorant” of the law, rendering the
agreement illegal.206 Of course, as a general proposition, every citizen is expected
to know the law.207 However, Comment a to section 180 explains that if the
agreement violates a statute “of a local, specialized or technical nature,” the more
inexperienced party to the agreement may have a tenable contention that he or
she was not in pari delicto.208 In short, the court should realistically assess the
party’s situation to determine whether there is a sensible basis for allocating the
risk of illegality to the party and denying them all judicial relief.
The same mode of analysis applies here. The proposed reform allowing the
plaintiff ’s case to proceed would come into play when the defendant has a much
closer relationship to the sovereign invoking the privilege. More speciﬁcally, the
reform would apply when the defendant should have foreseen that there was a
distinct possibility that during performance the government might invoke its
privilege and interfere with performance.
To illustrate, suppose an experienced government contractor bids on and
is awarded a prime military contract for a new weapons system. In the words
of the General Dynamics Court, the contractor is “a repeat player” in the industry.209

201
Another common-law maxim is “ignorantia eorum quae scire tenetur non excusat,” which
means ignorance is no excuse. Ignorantia eorum quae scire tenetur non excusat, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
202

See CONTRACTS, supra note 199, § 22.1(c), at 777.

203

See CONTRACTS, supra note 199, § 22.1, at 777–78.

204

See CONTRACTS, supra note 199, § 22.1, at 777–78.

205

Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1907 (2011).

206

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 180 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

207

See supra note 201 and accompanying text.

208

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 180 cmt. a.

209

Gen. Dynamics, 131 S. Ct. at 1909.
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As a veteran repeat player, again in the words of General Dynamics, the contractor
would “assume[] the risk that state secrets would prevent the adjudication of
claims of inadequate performance.”210 Next, assume that the general contractor
subcontracts with a supplier with little or no prior experience in government
contracting. Although the prime contract gives the general contractor’s employees
limited access to classiﬁed information relevant to the weapons project, the
subcontractor’s employees do not gain such access. Suppose further that during
the later performance of the prime contract and subcontract, the government
asserts its state secrets privilege and that when the general contractor ceases
performance of the subcontract, the subcontractor sues. As in General Dynamics,
the general and subcontractor may now be parties to an unenforceable contract.
However, there is clearly a stronger inference of assumption of risk by the
defendant, the general contractor. Even if the government’s privilege claim
interferes with the general contractor’s ability to defend the subcontractor’s suit,
it is justiﬁable to allocate the risk to the general contractor and, therefore, to
permit the plaintiff subcontractor’s lawsuit to proceed.
This line of argument harks back to the seminal Totten decision. As previously
stated, in Totten, Justice Field asserted that “[b]oth employer and agent must have
understood that the lips of the other were to be for ever sealed respecting the
relation of either to the matter.”211 In Totten, there was an equally strong inference
of assumption of risk for both parties. Then in Tenet,212 the Court resorted to the
same rationale and quoted that very same passage from Totten.213 That line of
reasoning is germane here.
In contrast, on the facts of the hypothetical, there is a much clearer inference
of assumption of risk by the defendant general contractor. Hence, it is perfectly
consistent with the policy rationale of the Court’s early state secret case, Totten,
and its last, General Dynamics, to permit the plaintiff subcontractor’s lawsuit
against the general to proceed with discovery and to trial. This line of reasoning
is broad and powerful enough to apply to both simple defenses and true
afﬁrmative defenses.

V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been twofold. The ﬁrst purpose was to
debunk the generalization cited at the beginning of the article that after a
successful state secret claim a case “will proceed . . . with no consequences save
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those resulting from the loss of evidence.”214 If that generalization were true
and the plaintiff had enough unprivileged evidence to satisfy his or her initial
burden of production, most cases would still proceed to trial. However, as we have
seen, that is not the case. Quite to the contrary, in many cases where the plaintiff
has a prima facie case, the case terminates immediately after a successful privilege
claim is brought. The case terminates: (1) under Totten because allowing the
case to proceed would create an intolerable risk of inadvertent disclosure of
privileged information; (2) under Molerio because the government’s submission
establishes that there is a dispositive defense; or (3) because the exclusion of the
privileged information would interfere with the defendant’s ability to present a
plausible simple or afﬁrmative defense.
After exposing the exaggerated nature of the generalization, this article
turned to a second objective: undertaking a critical evaluation of the current
state of the law. Parts II and Part III of this article demonstrated that in most of
the categories of cases, the government’s privilege claim leads to a peremptory
defense victory, leaving the litigants where they were before the plaintiff ﬁled
suit against the defendant. Although the Court in General Dynamics advanced
two broad policy arguments for leaving T.S. Eliot’s universe undisturbed,215 Part
IV explained that there are limits to those policy arguments. When there is a
sensible basis for allocating the burden of the lost evidence to the defendant,
the defendant should not be entitled to summary judgment simply because the
evidentiary loss handicaps the defense presentation at trial. If the defendant
was so closely aligned with the government that it was in a superior position to
foresee the privilege assertion and the consequent disruption of its relationship
with the plaintiff, there is a solid policy basis for allocating the risk to the
defendant. This argument is broad enough to extend to simple defenses, but
applies with special force to afﬁrmative defenses. The issue in question is an
afﬁrmative defense because of the weighty policy considerations justifying the
defendant carrying the burdens of pleading, production, and proof on the issue.
The government’s privilege claim neither eliminates those policies nor reduces
their importance.
In these exceptional circumstances, the court should consider permitting the
plaintiff to proceed. As previously stated, the court should certainly not grant
the plaintiff the sort of peremptory victory that the defense usually obtains. The
court should neither enter summary judgment in the plaintiff ’s favor nor direct a
verdict in the plaintiff ’s favor. Even if the plaintiff proceeds, the ﬁnal denouement
of the litigation may be a defense victory: A key witness for the plaintiff may
unexpectedly die; the witness might be so nervous that he or she forgets testimony
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vital to the plaintiff ’s case on the stand; or the witness may display negative
demeanor prompting the jury to disbelieve the witness’s testimony. Accordingly,
the plaintiff ’s limited right to proceed with trial will not guarantee a plaintiff ’s
verdict. Nevertheless, the government’s successful privilege claim should not deny
the plaintiff his or her day in court. In the rare circumstances described in Part IV,
in the grand tradition of the adversary system,216 courts should give the plaintiff
the opportunity to fairly win a verdict.

216

See Stephan Landsman, Readings on Adversarial Justice: The American Approach to Litigation
(1988); Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth
Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497 (1990).
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